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RECENT CASES
relieve the actor of liability, except where that force is the intentionally
tortious or criminal act of a third person. 8
According to comment b of See. 442B, it is immaterial to the
actor's liability that the harm is brought about in a manner which
no one in his position could possibly have been expected to foresee
or anticipate. The Restatement rule, if adopted by the court, would
give trial courts and lawyers a more concrete standard to work with
in dealing with cases involving intervening cause. The rule would lend
itself to a more consistent application than the present Kentucky rule.
Finally, it would force citizens to become more cognizant of the
dangers and traps which they, through their negligence, lay for an
ever increasing number of people likely to come into contact with
them.
If, however, the court considers the tentative Restatement rule too
harsh, it should at least widen the gap between those acts which it
considers to be foreseeable and those which it considers to be un-
foreseeable and hold only those truly extraordinary acts to be super-
seding causes.
Robert 1. Greene
CoNsTrrtTioNAL LAw-IGHT To CouNsL.-Danny Escobedo, a twenty-
two-year-old was arrested and taken to police headquarters for interro-
gation in connection with a fatal shooting. Escobedo made several re-
quests to see his lawyer which were denied even though the lawyer
was present in the building. The accused was not advised by the
police of his right to remain silent and, after persistent questioning by
the police, made a damaging statement which was admitted at the
trial. The state's highest court saw the confession as voluntary, and
sustained the conviction.' Held: Reversed.
Where .. . the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity
to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned
him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused
has been denied 'the Assistance of Counsel' in violation of the Sixth
Amendment as made obligatory upon the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment, and that no statement elicited by the police during the
interrogation may be used against him at a criminal trial. Eccobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
The question is when the right to counsel begins. Escobedo pro-
vides that it attaches when the police investigation has begun to
8 RESTATEZMNT (sEcoNm), TORTS § 442B (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1963).
1 People v. Escobedo, 28 M. 2d 41, 190 N.E.2d 825 (1963).
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"focus" on a particular suspect. Although the decision is anchored
upon the right to counsel, it inherently involves the privilege against
self-incrimination, since the primary aim of the police interrogation
is to obtain a confession or implicating statement from the accused.
Escobedo makes it clear that in a pretrial police interrogation the
accused has a right to remain silent, which he must competently and
intelligently waive before any self-incriminating statements will be
admissible at the trial. "At the very least the Court held that where
the accused has not been effectively warned of his right to remain
silent, he is entitled to counsel to enforce that right if he has retained
and requested counsel."2 But neither retention of nor request for
counsel seems essential, for in other situations the right to counsel,
once established, has not depended upon these factors.
3
The Court emphasizes that the period of interrogation even before
an indictment may be so critical as to require the presence of counsel.
The Court reasons that no meaningful distinction can be drawn be-
tween interrogation of an accused before and after formal indict-
ment.4 When Escobedo was denied the opportunity to consult with
his attorney, his status changed from suspect to accused, and the
purpose of the interrogation changed from an investigation of an
unsolved crime to the elicitation of a confession. Escobedo had, for
all practical purposes, already been charged with murder. Thus, the
Court held that when the process shifts from investigatory to ac-
cusatory, that is, when it focuses on the accused and its purpose is to
elicit a confession, our adversary system begins to operate, and the
accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer.6 Anything less
might deny a defendant "effective representation at the only stage
when legal aid and advice would help him."
7
The key to Escobedo is the realization that the decision aims at
pretrial abuses of police power, with the purpose of preserving the
trial itself in the adversary context of our legal system. In holding
that the right to counsel attaches when the process changes from
investigatory to accusatory, the Court recognized that the coercive
power of the state may confront the suspect prior to the initiation of
2 Kurland, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 143, 219 (1964).
3 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 495 (1964), (White J., dissenting);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Lee v. United States, 322 F.2d 770 (5th
Cir. 1963).4 Escobedo v. Illinois, supra note 3, at 486; Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201 (1964); People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628 (1963).
5 Escobedo v. Illinois, supra note 3, at 485-86.
6 Id. at 492.
7 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964), quoting Douglas,
J., concurring in Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 326 (1959).
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formal judicial proceedings, and that the interrogation that follows
upon arrest is a crucial stage in the attempt to establish guilt. In
excluding incriminating statements obtained by the police as involun-
tary, the Court, in the past, has based involuntariness on physical
or psychological pressures that overpower the accused's will to remain
silent. The accused's ignorance of his right to remain silent and
denial of counsel were merely relevant factors in that determination.8
But Escobedo stresses that a suspect physically within the power of
interrogators is inevitably under coercive pressure unless he knows
of his right to remain silent and has no fear that he will suffer if he
asserts that right.
Once the investigation has ceased to be a general inquiry of an
unsolved crime and has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the
question arises as to exactly what right comes into play. Does the
suspect have the right to consult with his attorney before resuming
the interrogation, or the right to have the lawyer's continued presence
from that point on? The decision indicates that the latter is the rule,
for only by the presence of counsel can the rights of the accused
be effectively protected. As long as the interrogation process is con-
ducted in secrecy, without a transcript, and without an impartial
observer, the accused may be unable to prove that he did not waive
his privilege, but with counsel present, the police would not be as
likely to violate the rights of the accused.
A significant aspect of Escobedo may be its effect in cutting into
the state's "head start" in preparing its case. The state is represented
by skilled investigators, whereas previously, the accused has been
forced to stand alone at least until the interrogation period has ended.
The right to counsel during pre-indictment interrogation in the ab-
sence of intelligent waiver, if made absolute by the Court, will be of
special importance to the indigent defendant as it will afford him the
early representation that will enable his counsel to face the prose-
cutor on more even terms. It should be obvious that only if the
defense has an opportunity to prepare for trial substantially equal
to that enjoyed by the prosecution can a criminal proceeding be con-
sidered fair in any realistic sense. This means that counsel must have
access to the accused soon after arrest.9 Aside from the ability to
advise the accused during the actual interrogation, this early contact
s Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 516-17 (1963); Culombe v. Con-
necticut, 367 U.S. 568, 601-02 (1961).
9 See Beaney, Right to Counsel Before Arraignment, 45 Minn. L. Rev.
771 (1961).
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with the client may produce the names of potential witnesses, evi-
dence, and other factors which might contribute to the defense.10
Escobedo appears to be contrary to the leading case in Kentucky
on the right to counsel during pre-indictment interrogation. In Bauer
v. Commonwealth, 1 the defendant, on advice of his counsel, reported
to police headquarters after having learned he was sought by the
police. He was questioned for several hours during which time his
attorney was not allowed to see him. During the interrogation period,
Bauer confessed. Convicted of murder, he appealed, in part on the
ground that the Commonwealth's refusal to allow his counsel to be
present during the interrogation invalidated any statement he had
made. The court of appeals affirmed, basing its decision on Cicenia
v. LeGay and Crooker v. California.12 The Bauer case falls within the
narrowest possible interpretation of Escobedo, and although the
Court in Escobedo does not expressly overrule either Cicenia or
Crooker, 3 it does state that "to the extent that Cicenia or Crooker may
be inconsistent with the principles announced today, they are not to
be regarded as controlling."14
In the last analysis, Escobedo is a landmark decision in a trend of
recent cases15 recognizing demands that the accused be represented
by counsel at an early stage of the pretrial proceedings in order to
afford protection of his right against self-incrimination. The decision
raises many questions as to its scope and effect on criminal procedure.
Will the right to counsel during interrogation be made absolute?
Will it be extended to the time of arrest? Does the decision apply to
misdemeanors? In reality, one can confidently say of Escobedo only
that its meaning depends on how far and fast the Court is willing to
use the opinion's potential for expansion.
Alex W. Rose
10 See Allison, He Needs A Lawyer Now, 42 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 113 (1958);
flight to Counsel During Police Interrogation, 16 Rutgers L. Rev. 573 (1962).
11364 S.W.2d 655 (Ky. 1963).
12 Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958). The case is factually similar to
Bauer. Cicenia was charged with murder, surrendered on advice of his attorney,
and during interrogation confessed. His lawyer was denied access to his client
throughout the day. The Court held that Cicenia had no right to consult counsel
during the police investigation. In Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 504 (1958),
petitioner complained that his confession was obtained after he had several
times requested and been refused the services of an attorney. The Court affrmed
the conviction emphasizing that Crooker was an educated man with some knowl-
edge of criminal procedure, having completed one year of law study.
1'Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. at 491-92. The Court rather unsuccessfully
attempts to distinguish them.
14 Id. at 492.
15 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); White v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); Spano v. New York,
360 U.S. 315 (1959); People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628
(1963).
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